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Abstract: Recent work on optimal monetary and fiscal policy in New Key-
nesian models suggests that it is optimal to allow steady-state debt to follow
a random walk. Leith and Wren-Lewis (2012) consider the nature of the time-
inconsistency involved in such a policy and its implication for discretionary
policy-making. We show that governments are tempted, given inflationary ex-
pectations, to utilize their monetary and fiscal instruments in the initial period
to change the ultimate debt burden they need to service. We demonstrate that
this temptation is only eliminated if following shocks, the new steady-state debt
is equal to the original (efficient) debt level even though there is no explicit
debt target in the government’s objective function. Analytically and in a se-
ries of numerical simulations we show which instrument is used to stabilize the
debt depends crucially on the degree of nominal inertia and the size of the
debt-stock. We also show that the welfare consequences of introducing debt are
negligible for precommitment policies, but can be significant for discretionary
policy. Finally, we assess the credibility of commitment policy by considering a
quasi-commitment policy which allows for different probabilities of reneging on
past promises. This on-line Appendix extends the results of this paper.
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1 Introduction
In Leith and Wren-Lewis (2012) we consider optimal monetary and fiscal policy
in the face of shocks which raise the level of debt, where the policy maker can
either act under full commitment, discretion or an intermediate case of quasi-
commitment. This appendix complements the analysis of the paper, by present-
ing additional results. Firstly, Section 2 explores the implications of treating
government spending as an exogenous stream that needs to be financed, rather
than as a policy instrument which can be chosen optimally. In the main paper
we conduct a robustness analysis by varying the degree of price stickiness and
the initial debt-gdp ratio. Section 3 extends that robustness analysis by varying
the remaining key model parameters, the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion, 1/σ, and the labor supply parameter, ϕ. Across all parameter variants
the key results of the main paper are unaffected. Finally, section 4 provides
the matrix representation of the model considered in the paper in a manner
which enables us to nest the commitment, discretion and quasi-commitment
descriptions of policy considered in the paper. We also outline the numerical
algorithms of Himmels and Kirsanova (2012) which we use to solve the model
under quasi-commitment.
2 Exogenous Government Spending
In the main paper we allowed government spending to be chosen optimally
by the policy maker. We did so to reflect the fact that all the major fiscal
consolidations analyzed by the IMF(2012) relied heavily on spending cuts to
stabilize debt, as it was argued that electorates were increasingly resistant to tax
increases. We found that, contrary to observed behavior, optimal policy would
not imply significant adjustment of the government spending gap in an attempt
to stabilize debt. While, some adjustment through tax revenues was possible,
particularly at low debt-gdp ratios and high degrees of price stickiness, typically
time-consistent fiscal stabilization relied on the reduction of debt service costs
through a relaxation of monetary policy. In this section, for completeness, we
reassess those results when we assume that government spending is not used
as an instrument in the policy maker’s problem. As would be expected from
the earlier results, this does not significantly change the results presented in the
main paper. Here we present the Figures analogous to Figures 1 and 2 in the
main paper.
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Figure 1: Evolution of Debt under Discretion as a function of Price Stickiness
and the Debt/GDP Ratio - Exogenous G.
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Figure 2: Response to Debt Shock under Commitment (C) and Discretion -
Exogenous G.
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3 Robustness Analysis
In this section we re-create some of the Figures from the main paper under
alternative parameters. To begin with we allow for alternative values for the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1/σ, specifically σ = 1 and 3, which
covers the ranges of this parameter typically considered in the macro literature.
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Figure 3: Evolution of Debt Under Discretion - σ = 1
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Figure 4: Evolution of Debt under Discretion - σ = 3
We now consider the same Figure, but with additional values of the labour
supply parameter ϕ = 2 and 3, having returned to the benchmark calibration
σ = 2.
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Figure 5: Evolution of Debt under Discretion - ϕ = 2
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Figure 6: Evolution of Debt under Discretion - ϕ = 3
8
We now turn to Figure 4 in the paper which considers the relative contri-
bution to debt stabilization under discretion across the same parameter per-
mutations. Firstly, variations in the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution.
−0.1
−0.1 −0
.1
0
0
0
0.2
0.
2
0.2
0.2
0.
5
0.
5
0.5
0.5
0.
8
0.
8
0.
8
0.
8
0.8
0.8
1
1
1 1
1
.1
1.
1
1.1
Contribution of Tax Instruments to Debt Adjustment
P
ri
ce
 S
tic
ki
n
e
ss
 θ p
Debt/GDP ratio (%)
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
0.
05
0.
05
0.05 0.05
0.
2
0.
2
0.2
0.2
0.
5 0.5
0.5
0.
8 0.8
0.8
0 8
1 1 1
1 1 1
Contribution of Surprise Inflation to Debt Adjustment
P
ri
ce
 S
tic
ki
n
e
ss
 θ p
Debt/GDP ratio (%)
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
−0
.1
−0.1 −0.1
0
0
0 0
0
.2
0.
2
0.2
0.2
0.2 0
.5
0.
5
0.5
0.5
0.8
0.
8
0.8
0.8
1
1
1
Contribution of Monetary Accomodation to Debt Adjustment
P
ri
ce
 S
tic
ki
n
e
ss
 θ p
Debt/GDP ratio (%)
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
−0
.2
−0
.1
−0
.1
−0.1
−
0.05
−0.05
−0
.0
5
−0.05
−0.02
−0
.02
−0.02
−0.02−0.02
−0.01
−0.01
−0.01 −0.01
Contribution of Government Spending to Debt Adjustment
P
ri
ce
 S
tic
ki
n
e
ss
 θ p
Debt/GDP ratio (%)
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Figure 7: Contribution to Debt Stabilisation under Discretion - σ = 1
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Figure 8: Contribution to Debt Stabilisation under Discretion - σ = 3
Similarly for the alternative values of the Frisch elasticity.
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Figure 9: Contribution to Debt Stabilisation under Discretion - ϕ = 2
4 Quasi-Commitment
In this section we we follow Himmels and Kirsanova (2012) in recasting the
quasi-commitment of Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) and Debertoli and
Nunes (2010) in a general linear-quadratic form which can be solved using stan-
dard iterative techniques. This also nests the cases of commitment (α = 0) and
discretion (α = 1) which can be solved using the computer codes of Soderlind
(1999). We can write our model in the standard form as,
∙
yt+1
Etxt+1
¸
= A
∙
yt
Etxt
¸
+But +Cξt
where yt =
⎡
⎣
bt
ygt−1
at−1
⎤
⎦, xt =
∙
cgt
πt
¸
, are the vectors of predetermined and
jump variables respectively, while ut =
⎡
⎣
bτ t
ggt
rgt
⎤
⎦ is the vector of controls. The
coefficient matrices are defined as, A = [A0]−1A1, B = [A0]−1B1 and C =
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Figure 10: Contribution to Debt Stabilisation under Discretion - ϕ = 3
[A0]
−1C1 where,
A0 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
β wNτ
b
(1 + ϑ) f −σβ −β
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 σ−1
0 γϕ 0 0 β
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, A1 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 0 0 σ(β + wNτ
b
) −1
0 0 0 θ 0
0 0 ρa 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 −γσ 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
B1 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
−wNτ
b
1
1−τ
G
b
0
0 1− θ 0
0 0 0
0 0 σ−1
−γ τ1−τ 0 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
The objective function for the policy maker can be written as,
Γ = −N1+ϕ 1
2
E0
∞X
t=0
βt{σθ(bcgt )2 + σ(1− θ)( bGgt )2 + ϕ(bY gt )2 + γ π2t}
= −N1+ϕ 1
2
E0
∞X
t=0
βt{
⎡
⎣
yt
xt
ut
⎤
⎦
0
D0QD
⎡
⎣
yt
xt
ut
⎤
⎦}
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where
Q =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
σθ 0 0 0
0 σ(1− θ) 0 0
0 0 ϑ 0
0 0 0 ελ
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ and D =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 θ 0 0 (1− θ) 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
This enables us to write the policy problem for the policy maker operating under
quasi commitment as,
min−N1+ϕ 1
2
E0
∞X
t=0
((1−α)β)t{
⎡
⎣
yt
xt
ut
⎤
⎦
0
D0QD
⎡
⎣
yt
xt
ut
⎤
⎦+αβy0t+1Sdyt+1} (1)
subject to,
yt+1 = A11yt +A12xt +B1ut +Cξt (2)
(1− α)Etxt+1 + αHyt+1 = A21yt +A22xt +B2ut (3)
where y0t+1S
dyt+1 = V (bt+1, at) is the value function of the corresponding
problem under discretion, and H is the link between jump and state variables
for that same problem Therefore as α tends towards zero we move towards
the commitment problem, and as α tends to 1 discretion. More generally, in
the second line of the constraints, we can see that as we increase α the policy
maker is forced to take expectations as given by the solution to the discretionary
problem, while for lower values of α they are able to commit in a manner which
successfully manipulates expectations. In the absence of any endogenous state
variables, this would reduce to the case where expectations are increasingly
taken as given by the policy maker as α increases. The policy problem is then
solved using the computer codes developed in Himmels and Kirsanova (2012),
which corresponds to those developed by Soderlind (1999) in the special cases
of commitment (α = 0) and discretion (α = 1).
Given H and Sd, the combination of the model and focs for the policy
problem can be solved via Schur decomposition to generate a solution in the
following form,
⎡
⎣
ut
xt
ψt
⎤
⎦ = X
∙
yt
ϕt
¸
,
∙
yt+1
ϕt+1
¸
= M
∙
yt
ϕt
¸
, and (4)
W (yt+1,ϕt) =
1
2
∙
yt
ϕt
¸0
U
∙
yt
ϕt
¸
where ψt and ϕt are the vectors of lagrange multipliers associated with the
constraints in (2) and (3), respectively. Himmels and Kirsanova (2012) then
suggest the following solution algorithm.
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• GuessM , X and U (which implicitly includes guesses of H and Sd).
• Use these guesses to update U by using the guessed solution in (1).
• Obtain the solution to the model and FOCs conditional on the last itera-
tion to updateM and X.
• Continue to iterate until there is no further updating ofM , X and U.
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